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517 668 to bring about an equalitarian and all-human brotherhood of men on a global scale. Seeking to realize these bi-polar objectives, the Bolsheviks have inherited and reinforced the basic contradictions and conflicts between the aspirations of the rulers and those of the subjects which have throughout centuries undermined the stability of Czardom.

668 661 In their effort to perpetuate themselves in power, the Bolsheviks had to remain organized as a ruling elite of professional conspirators and to reinforce dominance-submission relationships in a system of total power concentrated in their hands. To maintain such a political rule, the Bolsheviks had to introduce a system of total dependence of all upon the holders of power and thus to reinforce the attitudes of self-effacement. They also established a planned system of social differentiation and isolation to prevent social intimacy and group solidarity and hence the potentiality of organized opposition to their rule.

668 771 In such conditions, feelings of rejection and traditional longings for an equalitarian and all-human brotherhood of men have been greatly strengthened among the subjects. It is this situation that points out the fundamental weakness of the Soviet system. To counteract the effects of this basic vulnerability of their regime, the Bolsheviks have endeavored to deify the Soviet rulers, have resorted to the damnation and anathema of the Western world, and have embarked on a propaganda campaign for a Messianic redemption of all suffering and exploited humanity. In this manner, the Bolsheviks have been able to appeal to supra-ethnical and supra-personal loyalties and to all-human longings, not unlike a universal church.

[208] The Bolsheviks have also endeavored to build up the morale of their subjects by means of prestige projects, by mythical undertakings, by mass pageantry, mass unanimous voting and large scale militarization. All these devices are conceived as ways to provoke emotional identification of the masses with the Soviet State and to find in this identification a substitute for their yearnings for a community of free and equal men.

642 665 Total dominance and total submission relationships which have to be maintained to perpetuate this conspiratorial system of power have introduced other basic strains and stresses in the

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Soviet social and political structure. The ruling Party which has to remain as an organization of militant conspirators in order to perpetuate itself in power, must also rely for the recruitment of its cadres to a large extent on calculating "careerists" and other self-seekers, who identify themselves not with their group and their society but with the holders of power. The main concern of these people is to rise in the Party and State hierarchy. In their jockeying and struggle for positions and favors, these power-oriented people introduce into the Party and into the government an atmosphere of subservience and ruthlessness, rivalry and intrigue, each seeking to rise on the cadavers of his associates.

Just as in the society of steppe warriors, such a ruling group of power-seekers who are not bound by deep moral bonds or ties of ideological loyalty can be kept together as long as the opportunities for self-aggrandizement exist, or as long as there is a common threat to their positions. Hence a cult of hatred of internal and external "enemies," political expansion, conspiracy on a world scale and planned international tension—short of all-out warfare—have become conditions of survival of Bolshevik power.

This situation forces the Bolsheviks to preoccupy themselves with the problems of security, of defense, and of extension of their political power; it prompts them to subordinate the economic production and the intellectual endeavors to these primary needs of their political survival. Such conditions, in turn, make it difficult to satisfy the demands of the masses for acceptance and for a better and more secure life—a situation that tends to deter the subjects from identifying themselves with the rulers and with the State. And it is this aggravating antithesis between the longings of the multitudes and the power-drive of a ruling clique that breeds social upheaval and intensifies urges for destructive aggression.

It is therefore imminent that we think in terms of planned external pressures which might be brought to bear upon the resolution of this gigantic internal struggle before it reaches the proportions of a global war.

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By the end of that century[1] a faction of Russian radical intelligentsia fused the Russian Narodnik and Anarchist ideologies and practices with those of Western Socialism and formed the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries. The program of this Party was agrarian socialism and terrorism. They published leaflets and manifestos, and spread their ideas in the villages. The Socialist Revolutionaries preached open violence as a means of overthrowing the Czarist regime. They relied on the peasantry to start uprisings against the landlords and government officials, and to commit individual acts of terror to achieve their ends. Just as earlier, the Anarchists and Terrorists, the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, had a separate organization which specialized in perpetrating acts of terror:

> Where the lash and the whip are, there are also the bomb and the revolver! So has it been, so is it now, and so shall it be. When public indignation and hate become centered upon an agent of the regime whether he be placed high or low; when that agent becomes a symbol of violence and despotism; when his activity becomes harmful to the commonweal; when no means are available to render him harmless and his continued existence represents an affront to the social conscience, then is the door open to terror in the executor of the sentence pressed from the hearts of public-minded citizens.[7]

The terroristic organization of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries enjoyed complete autonomy within the Party. It had its own sources of revenue and was independent in selection of prospective victims. In the course of a few years of its existence it perpetrated more than two hundred acts of terror. Most of these consisted of assassinations or of attempted assassinations of highly placed officials of the government, including a member of the Imperial Family, two Ministers of Interior, thirty-nine governors, seventy-four ranking officers of the army and the navy, and fifty-two high police officials. Seventy percent of these acts of terror were perpetrated by workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors.[8]

The Socialist Revolutionaries relied mainly on middle and poor peasant strata. They attempted to widen the gap between the better-off and the poor, to set up the lowest strata against the upper, to stir class hatred against the kulaks. In their manifestos, leaflets, and speeches, the Socialist Revolutionaries harangued

[1] [i.e. 19th century -- Analyst]

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the peasantry, and appealed to their deeply rooted hostilities against the ruling classes, and against all people of means. In their proclamations to the peasantry they stated that "the land belongs to those who till it." They incited the peasants to appropriate by force hay, pasture, and timber. They also encouraged violence and murder against all those whom they held responsible for their plight.[9]

As a result of such propaganda and agitation combined with economic and social difficulties, peasant disturbances were renewed and increased in frequency and intensity. They led to the events of 1905. That year the government suffered a considerable loss of prestige because of the defeat on the battlefield (the Japanese War of 1904–1905). In such circumstances (the same as after the Crimean War), fear and awe and unconditional obedience—the foundations of Czarist rule—were shaken, internal disturbances ensued and threatened the existence of the Czardom. By this time the revolutionary eruptions of the peasantry were combined with those of the industrial proletariat. Between January and April, 1905, there were about 660,000 workers on economic and political strikes.[10] In October of the same year there was again a general strike.

In that month also a general peasant rising took place embracing three hundred districts in 47 gubernias. Again it was the central and southern regions that took the lead;[11] and again the gubernias in which the landlords suffered the heaviest losses were predominantly those where the system of repartitional land tenure prevailed over the system of individual peasant households and of hereditary holdings. In the communities with communal land holdings the dissatisfaction was greatest and violence ran especially high.

The activities of the Social Revolutionaries in the village were joined by those of the Bolsheviks. By the beginning of the twentieth century a wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party, the Bolsheviks, who earlier scorned the peasants and worked exclusively among the urban proletariat, began to pay more attention to the Russian village. They became impressed by the frequency and the intensity of the peasants' disturbances and realized that the peasantry presented potentially very ex-

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plosive revolutionary material. Hence the Bolsheviks began to send their agitators into the village.

There was no tendency among these extremists and maximalists to make use of peaceful means which had now been made possible by the Czar's Manifesto of October, 1905. In this manifesto legislative powers were given to Duma (house of representatives) and a certain degree of political, cultural and personal freedom was introduced. On the contrary these professional conspirators, following Anarchist precepts and practices, took advantage of increased opportunities for political agitation. That year the Socialist Revolutionaries in one of their proclamations stated: "If you need more land, hay, pasture, timber, take it from the landlord. Do not pay taxes. Drive evil priests out of the villages, boycott the courts, replace bad officials by good, throw out the police!"[12] In the same year the Bolsheviks, struck by the increasing restlessness in the village, called upon the peasants and the village proletariat for a "collective refusal to pay taxes, refusal to furnish recruits, refusal to fulfill the orders and commands of the government and its agents."[13]

III

Such revolutionary ideas which were infiltrating the villages not only confirmed the peasants in their beliefs and dispositions; they also tended to promote their feelings of rebelliousness, to radicalize them in the extreme, and push them toward excesses. In common with most tillers of land, the Russian peasants were convinced that the land by "natural right" belonged only to those who cultivate it, and that somehow, sometimes in the past, the land was taken away from them by force and trickery, not by right and justice.

The question of ownership of land was closely related to humiliating subservience to the landlords, the commune and the state. Ownership of land meant the regaining of self-respect. The peasants were therefore inclined to believe that they never lost the right to the land and that someday, somehow, all the land would have to be given back to them. "We are yours, but the land is ours" (*My vashi a zemlya nasha*), the peasants would say to the pomeshchiks. The speeches of the peasants' deputies

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and unemployment, a situation that was well exploited by the professional conspirators, particularly the Bolsheviks.

By the end of the nineteenth century the first wave of strikes swept the country.[4] At first the strikes were spontaneous, local and purely economic in character. The workers wanted higher wages and better working conditions. But since many industries were located in Petersburgh which was the center of heavy industry, and in Moscow which was the center of the railroad system and of the textile industry, the revolutionary intelligentsia and professional conspirators and agitators who were also concentrated in these two capitals could not fail to see great political opportunities, both in the concentration of the industrial proletariat, and in its economic plight. But there were differences among the revolutionary factions of the intelligentsia in regard to revolutionary propaganda and agitation.

The ideological differences as to propaganda policies and revolutionary strategy was one of the factors which led to the split of the Socialist Democratic Party into two factions, the *Bolsheviks* (the majority), and the *Mensheviks* (the minority). Being mostly of urban middle class origin the Mensheviks were inclined to advocate gradual advance of the country toward democratization. They also proposed an alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie. Accordingly also in internal Party organization the Mensheviks were in favor of a policy of liberalism and democracy. The Bolshevik faction, on the other hand, was recruited from among the raznochintsy who were affected by Anarchism and were inclined toward extremist solutions and recognized no compromise. They proposed an alliance with the revolutionary peasants and an armed rebellion staged by the workers and peasants as the most effective means of seizing power.

Following the ideas and practices of the Anarchists and the Terrorists (Narodovoltsy), the Bolsheviks claimed that the immediate seizure of power was of paramount importance while the work of educating the masses could begin later. That end, the seizure of power, to the Bolsheviks no less than to their political predecessors, the Anarchists, sanctified everything. Deliberate instigation of hatred, planned deceit, individual killing, armed uprising, and systematic terror were all equally approved

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means if they led to the final goal, revolution and the overthrow of the Czarist system. Thus even at that time the Party was placed above everything else and the interests and the rights of the individual had to be subordinated to the Party and to its supreme objective, the revolution. At the second congress of Russian Social Democrats, which took place in London in 1903 where the final split between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks occurred, Pasadovski, one of Lenin's aassiciates declared:

> There is no doubt that we do not agree on the following fundamental issue: should our future policy be subordinated to some kind of basic democratic principles, or should all democratic principles be subordinated exclusively to the advantages of our party. I decidedly advocate the latter. There is nothing among the democratic principles that we should not subordinate to the advantages of our Party. . . . Yes, also the inviolability of the individual. As a revolutionary party striving for its ultimate aim—social revolution, we should consider the democratic principles exclusively from the standpoint of the advantages of our party.[3]

This idea of supreme Party interests to which everybody and everything was subordinated was closely associated with the principle of centralistic and dictatorial party organization which was earlier conceived by Bakunin and later advocated by Lenin, and finally adopted by the Communist International.[4] Lenin said that the organizational principle of revolutionary social democracy demands the enlargement of the rights and plenary powers of the central body against the parts.[5] Just like Bakunin, Lenin advocated the need of a "close circle of professional revolutionaries"[6] who would compose a stable and continuous Party leadership. He claimed that in a country with despotic leadership, in a life and death struggle with Czarist police, a small but stable and continuous revolutionary committee at the top of the Party would be more efficient to lead a mass movement and therefore better equipped to seize power.[7]

This principle of centralized and autocratic Party leadership which had its roots in the self-seeking drives of the raznochintsy led eventually to the dictatorship of one man. Just as Bakunin saw only himself at the top of his revolutionary hierarchy, so did Lenin. Early in the history of the Party it was noticed that

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"Lenin always felt that the Party was he, that he was the will of the movement concentrated in one man, and he acted accordingly . . . "[8] It was this demand for total power and urge to perpetuate oneself in power that necessitated military discipline and frequent purges within the Party, just as earlier among the Terrorists, the same demand and urge fostered intolerance and hatred of all deviationists and outsiders, promoted mistrust and led to the use of terror inside and outside of Party ranks. Thus Lenin, too, approved of terror:

> We have never rejected terror on principle, nor can we ever do so. Terror is a form of military operation that may be usefully applied, or may even be essential in certain movements of the battle. . . .[9]

Extreme power-seeking and resulting dogmatism and inability to compromise, as well as the example set by the Anarchists and Terrorists, led even in the early years of Party life to an emphasis on hatred of the opponents and on ruthlessness in dealing with them. Thus, in early Bolshevik writings, the words "hatred," "ruthlessness," "irreconcilability," "mercilessness," "relentlessness," "extermination," "destruction," "wiping off," became prominent. When called before the Central Committee of the Party to answer for his accusations against some Party members, which the Central Committee considered unjust and false, Lenin prided himself on using unethical methods in fighting his opponents. He proudly admitted that his accusations were deliberately schemed to:

> . . . evoke in the reader hatred, aversion and contempt . . . calculated not to convince but to break up the ranks of the opponent, not to correct the mistake of the opponent but to destroy him, to wipe his organization off the face of the earth . . . to evoke the worst thoughts, the worst suspicions about the opponent . . . Against such political enemies I then conducted—and in the event of a repetition and development of a split shall always conduct a fight of extermination . . .[10]

It was this compulsive urge of the Bolsheviks to seize power by all and any means, their centralistic and military Party organization and their ruthlessness in dealing with their opponents that had enabled them to take advantage of the chaotic situa-

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665 tion which had developed in Russia after the February revolution and to achieve their main objective.

II

182 Just as earlier, in Turco-Mongol empires, the great weakness of the Czardom lay in its low degree of emotional and ideological unity And it is this basic vulnerability of the Czardom which has enabled a small, but determined, well disciplined and ruthless faction of professional conspirators to seize power. Like its patriarchal family the whole Czardom was torn by internal dissension and strife. The abusive and humiliating power relationships at all levels of social organization of the Czardom encouraged self-orientation and destructive aggressiveness which precluded tolerance, compromise and social cohesion.

In such circumstances it was difficult to develop a set of common values that would serve as a focal point of unity of all subjects and keep the society unified in face of all threats to its existence. Orthodox religion, as well as Russian nationalism, failed in its role of unifying ideologies in a society in which interpersonal and intergroup relationships provoked feelings of rejection, mistrust, emotional instability and extreme factionalism. Thus, instead of developing itself into an integrated community unified by common feelings and identification and common interests, there grew within the Czardom a number of separate and inimical worlds with confiicting expectations and demands and with differing images and visions.

184 There was the world of the peasants, the world of the landlords,
665 the world of the lower urban folk, the world of the clergy, the world of the bureaucracy, the world of the military, the world of the intelligentsia, the world of a small upper commercial and industrial class, and finally the separate worlds of ethnical, religious and national minorities. Since Russia had not developed a numerically strong and influential middle class to link and unify all these strata, there was little contact, less understanding and no mutual sympathy between these contrasting worlds. There were deep tensions and conflicts also within each one of these worlds and all were in a perpetual state of hostility and warfare among themselves.[11]

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self. And after the army which Czar Nicholas personally commanded in 1917 had suffered defeats at the hands of the enemies, and the chiefs of the armed forces suggested to the Czar that he should resign, he realized that his prestige had fallen and his authority gone. As out of spite he abdicated not only for himself but for his heirs as well. And as it has already happened in Russia's past, when the central authority suffered defeat and loss of prestige, all seething internal forces of revolt, relieved of the controls that kept them under check, burst out in violent eruptions. In such circumstances everybody deserted the Czar, even the Orthodox Church:

> Even the Orthodox Clergy, that class that had been an integrated part of the Czarist system deserted the Czar in the hour of his doom. Showing as much lack of a sense of proportion as the other classes of Russian society the official hierarchy went as far as to pass a decision according to which all lines containing the word "king" in the Psalms of David were to be deleted.[13]

III

All these circumstances, combined with the extreme factionalism within the intelligentsia, greatly facilitated the seizure of the power by the Bolsheviks. All the four national *Dumas* which were convoked since 1905 were composed predominantly of the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia. The same situation existed in the leading circles of all political parties.[14] But in each party, self-centeredness and lust for power led the intelligentsia into constant bickering among themselves and neverending fighting for leadership, a situation that manifested itself in numerous party splits.

It was only in the Bolshevik Party that the Party's Central Committee was well disciplined and unified under one leader who had absolutist and dictatorial powers. This sitution spared the Party too many splits. This Bolshevik system favored the reduction of Party leadership to a rather small number of intellectuals who relied on the semi-intelligentsia and industrial workers in local Party work. It was this dictatorial, centralistic and "aristocratic" organization of the Bolsheviks, as well as the extreme ruthlessness and aggressiveness of its leaders and fanat-

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565 517 icism of its rank and file, that gave this Party an advantage over its main rival for power, the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, in the chaotic days of 1917.

727 669 565 Just as it had happened in the past, a weakening of the prestige of the ruling classes as a result of defeats on the battlefield led to peasant uprisings. Almost immediately after the Czar's abdication, that is, in March, 1917, peasant rebellions arose in 34 districts and by June spread to 325 districts. The distrubances were again especially intensive in the upper Don and in the middle Volga, the regions where the tradition of revolt was strong and the situation for revolt matured owing to unsatisfactory conditions within the land communes.

665 669 The chaos that ensued in the village was emphasized by factional strife and indecision in the center. As a result of the fall of the old Czarist regime, the two most extreme revolutionary parties, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks, entered into a contest for power. While the Socialist Revolutionaries controlled the Provisional Government (since May, 1917), the Bolsheviks did everything to undermine their regime and to seize the power for themselves. In the question of rural policies, the government of Socialist Revolutionaries attempted to stop the outbreaks of lawlessness and disorder in the villages by promising an equitable solution of all rural problems on the basis of laws that were to be passed by a Constitutional Assembly.

[325] [565] But the Bolsheviks counteracted such policies by inciting the peasants to seize the lands at once. The Bolsheviks also deliberately sharpened the existing social cleavages in the villages by inciting the lower peasant strata against the upper. The Bolshevised soldiers, on leave or deserting the front, pushed more moderate elements into the background and led the peasant mobs not only against the landlords, but also against the more prosperous peasant classes. Hence, attacks on *Khutoryane* (hereditary peasant homestead owners) and *otrubniki* (peasant individual property owners) were as frequent as those against the manorial estates.

Many soldiers deserted the front because the Bolshevik agitators told them that the land was being distributed back home and that those who were present would get the choice grounds. The government, controlled by the Socialist Revolutionaries,

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appeared to be unable to solve these revolutionary outbursts, perhaps because the seeds of these revolts of the peasant masses had been sown by the revolutionary and terroristic propaganda of this same Party now in power. Moreover, this Party, though in power, was split into four factions which bitterly fought one another. Some of these factions allied themselves with the Bolsheviks to strengthen themselves in their internal Party fight. The ranks of the Bolsheviks therefore grew steadily from all sides. They had clearly defined aims and were well organized under the undisputed leadership of one man, whose unchallenged authority all Bolsheviks recognized. Their aim was to seize power at any cost and by any and all means.

In the face of an internally split and undecisive government which lacked authority, and in the midst of general chaotic conditions, the power of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the revolutionary bodies which were established throughout the country, steadily grew. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd was increasingly competing with the government for the control of the state. Because of their extremism, the influence of the Bolsheviks in these powerful revolutionary bodies soon became dominant. Thus, supported by bolshevised soldiers and proletariat and promising to bring peace, bread and equalitarian brotherhood to all, the Bolsheviks were enabled to seize power.[15]

In the civil war that followed between the Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks, the dissatisfied military ranks, the lower urban classes, the national and religious minorities, and a large part of the peasantry took the side of the Bolsheviks, who promised an anarchic and egalitarian Utopia for each and everyone, just as many religious sects, leaders of peasant uprisings, Anarchists and Terrorists have done before them. All those who yearned for equality and acceptance at all levels of Russian society either actively helped the Bolsheviks against the White armies, or, fearing the return of the old regime, were unwilling to fight with the Whites against Reds. The attitudes of these people, combined with the ruthlessness and resoluteness of Bolshevik political and military leadership, were decisive factors in this final victory of Bolshevism.[16]

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V

Power and Personality in Soviet Russia

21
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY AND REGIMENTATION

I

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BUILDING their rule on Czarist traditions and supported by Lenin's teachings and practices, the Bolsheviks undertook to perpetuate themselves in power by employing the same conspiratorial means which helped them to seize the control of the state. Such policies however were contrary to the expectations of those who yearned for an equalitarian brotherhood and demanded full political participation on equal terms for all. The Bolsheviks therefore had to elaborate on the theories which justified the "dictatorship of the proletariat." One of the fundamental ideological justifications which they put forward to explain their policy of self-perpetuation in power consisted of the claim that after the seizure of power by the proletariat, the class struggle does not cease or weaken, but on the contrary it "continues in new forms, and with even greater frenzy and ferocity, for the reason that the resistance of the exploiters to the fact of socialism is more savage than before."[1] Continued dictatorship

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is therefore said to be necessary as a means to completely eliminate "exploitation of man by man" and to bring about stateless and equalitarian society in the future.

In this manner any signs of opposition to the Party policies have been construed as "class struggle" and "counter-revolution" which made it possible for the self-seeking and mistrustful ruling faction of the Bolsheviks to eliminate all opposition to its rule, including the opposition within the Bolshevik Party itself. These means and justifications of self-perpetuation in power have been supported also by the contention that the counter-revolutionary schemes of the overthrown and dying classes are encouraged and fostered by foreign capitalist powers.

These imperialist states are said to tend to encircle the "only Socialist country" seeking to destroy it.[2] Contrary to the early Socialist promises that the state will tend to "wither away" after the proletariat had seized power, the Bolsheviks asserted that, after the proletarian revolution the state must become even more powerful because it must be used as a "special machine of suppresion."[3] Thus, instead of satisfying the traditional demands for acceptance in an all-human and stateless brotherhood, the Bolsheviks established relationships of absolute rule and unconditional obedience by monopolizing all social power in their hands. Each and every subject was made dependent for his life and livelihood upon the ruling faction. In this manner, planned economic regimentation, strict political conformity, control of thought and feeling, as well as police rule became intrinsic to the Soviet system of power.

In their compulsive drive to concentrate all power and all social control in their hands, the Bolsheviks dispossessed not only financial capitalists and large land owners, but even small farmers, fearing that these might eventually oppose and challenge their rule. "The medium peasantry is a self-sufficient class; the only one which, after the obliteration and expulsion of squires and capitalists, remains capable of opposing the proletariat," said Lenin.[4]

The need to regiment the peasantry, to break their group solidarity and make them completely dependent upon the government was supported also by other considerations. Owing to lack

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to force the peasants to join the collectives and the state farms. Those who opposed such policies were resettled or banished to convict labor camps. Many were massacred. According to Stalin ten million peasants became victims of this "class war."[5]

In order to insure their complete control over the farming population, the Bolshevik leaders sent the most trusted Party people from the city to the village to manage the newly formed *kolhozes*. These *novye bary* (new lords), as the peasants called them, installed themselves in the mansions of former estate owners and kept themselves at a considerable distance from the rural population, not unlike the former serf-owners. And not unlike the former gentry the new masters were also bent upon extracting maximum labor from the peasantry with minimum reward.

Under such conditions, the peasants, in the first outbursts of their reaction against this state of abusive submission resorted to outward aggression in the form of traditional uprisings. They burnt their crops and slaughtered their cattle rather than collectivize them. It is estimated that almost two-thirds of the entire livestock and a large part of the crops were destroyed.[6] Such a situation affected even the Ukraine, the "granary of Russia" and greatly contributed to the famine of 1932–33 in which hundreds of thousands of people died of starvation and epidemics. It was by such active rebellion that the peasantry forced the Party into a temporary retreat. The Party had to appease the peasants by giving each peasant household the right to retain in private use a small plot of land, and also in private possession a limited number of livestock. Also, private trade in agricultural products was restored in a limited degree.[7]

These were however only temporary concessions, since the Bolsheviks were determined to completely "industrialize" the peasantry as a means of political and economic control. Following such aims the highest possible degree of specialization in farm operation has been fostered and the members of the same family have been assigned to different, spacially separated activities. In this manner the agricultural brigade instead of the peasant family became the basic unit of agricultural production. For the same reason the highest possible degree of mechanization of

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upon the regime than the peasantry and industrial labor. The objective of this policy has been to prevent among the intelligentsia formation of an *esprit de corps* and opposition to Bolshevik rule, and to command the services and unquestionable obedience of every educated man. These are the political foundations of the growing and deliberately fostered stress on rank and distinction, on social differentiation, sense of superiority and inferiority, absolute superordination and blind subordination.

In the upper strata, much more so than in the lower classes, the process of hierarchal and functional differentiation is fostered and maintained not only by means of specialization of work and differences in rank, but also by means of sharply differentiated income, and by means of differential distribution of spoils, and of privileges. This sharp stratification of Soviet society, rooted in the traditions of the Czardom, in its own turn promotes power-seeking and domineering, dependency and subservience, as well as lack of social intimacy and lack of trust.

The highest privileges in the Soviet society are accruing to the top ruling faction of professional conspirators. But this group is itself internally sharply differentiated. It is headed by the Party Leader (*Vozhd*), and is divided into a number of policy making bodies, among which the Political Bureau (Politburo), now to be known as the Presidium,[1] is of foremost importance. Though the members of the Presidium and of other top policy making bodies, such as the Secretariat, are formally appointed by the Central Committee of the Party, they are *de facto* selected by the supreme leader and therefore depend upon him for their position. Such a situation fosters bickering among top ranking officials in their mutual struggle to win the favors of the head man, which in turn enables the supreme Party leader to play one faction of his camarilla against the other one or—not unlike in the days of the Czars—to select a more intimate inner circle of a few most trusted persons on whom to rely for advice and help. These then assist the leader in selecting and in eliminating the members of the top ranking hierarchy, according to expediency and circumstances.

This highly concentrated power structure is supported by a

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corresponding Party structure on the lower levels of the Party hierarchy where Party Secretariats hold the reins of power. In this system of political and social control it is the Party Secretariats on local, regional and republic levels that are of pivotal importance.[2] Through his control of the Central Party Secretariat, the supreme Party leader is enabled to select the most useful and the most trusted people for such offices.[3]

The top Party leadership is therefore in a position to direct the recruitment of Party membership. It is empowered to accept and to expel members. It directs the secretariats on the lower levels of Party hierarchy as to whom the Party shall "elect" as its officers and as its deputies to the higher Party bodies, or whom to delegate to the local or national Soviets, and other representative Party or non-Party institutions. It consults with the secretariats about the appointment of trusted Party members to responsible regional and republic government and managerial positions, and it checks on fulfillment of Party directives. This checking is done through the Committee of Party Control whose representatives function independently of local Party bodies.[4]

Stalin was well aware of the significance of the selection of leading Party personnel from the point of view of perpetuation of power when he said "Cadres decide everything." It was by his control of the top Party Secretariat that he himself was enabled to eliminate all his opponents in the hierarchy and to rise to undisputed and absolute leadership.

Since it is local, regional and republic Party secretaries who form the axis of this monolithic Party-state machine, the position of such potentates yields great power, and high material rewards. Such offices are therefore sought after by people of great ambition and lust for power, also by people of fighting, conspiratorial and domineering inclinations. Thus it is the zealous, the shrewd, the calculating and the career-minded people who are also efficient and hard-driving that tend to be picked out for these positions because it is such people on whom the Party can rely for a blind and unquestioning execution of all orders. The Party which has remained essentially a conspiratorial organization demands militancy and aggressiveness, a severe and exacting attitude toward subordinates, irreconcilability and lack of com-

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passion towards deviants and slackers, lack of intimacy among associates, complete dedication, and humbleness concerning one's own achievements.

Since the Party membership must assist the Party secretaries in the execution of Party policies, it is from among the same types of people that a significant part of the Party membership tends to be recruited. Such people form the hard core of the Party cells and the *aktivs* of Party and government institutions. They are likely to be distant and stern, critical and demanding; they watch over and feel responsible for the behaviour of others, but show no personal consideration or concern.[5]

Another part of Party membership is recruited from among the people who are not zealous, nor over-ambitious nor blindly submissive, but are especially useful to the Party because of their occupational or professional skills. Such people are likely to be competent, as well as humane, considerate, close to their subordinates and understanding in their relations with non-Party men. These people tend to alleviate the harshness of Soviet oppressive bureaucracy and perform therefore a function which is analogous to the role of the mother in the patriarchal Russian family.

It is however the hard core of zealots and careerists who are on the ascendancy and who direct Party work and control government administration and economic management with the help of the aktivs, that is, groups of selected and trusted persons formed within every organization to assist its leadership according to the Party directives. Aktiv is a cardinal agency of Party control. It is an institution of vigilance, supervision and intelligence, as well as an instrument of guidance and planned political manipulation. In the Party itself the role of the aktivs is of fundamental importance:

> Meetings of Party *aktiv* members play an outstanding role in the life of the Party organizations. It is at these meetings that the decisions of the Party and government as well as major problems in the life and work of the Party are discussed. The meetings of Party activists are a means of expression of Party public opinion; they are a forum for Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism.[6]

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By choosing the "right" people to fill the key Party positions, by using Party aktivs as an instrument of vigilance and political manipulation, and by systematic periodical purges of Party members and of Party officials who do not come up to the standards set up by the Party hierarchy, the whole Party is regimented and kept in submission according to the will of one man and his innermost circle. By an efficient control of such a regimented Party the life of the whole society is manipulated since the Party members are the "leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state."[7] It is also upon the Party's recommendation that all the important appointments in the government, managerial and military hierarchy and in learned professions are made. Hence by controlling the Party, the Party leadership is enabled to regiment the whole society and to make it dependent upon its will.

Such a Party, however, in order to perpetuate its leadership and to maintain its undisputed dominance, must preserve ideological and organizational unity, rigid discipline and *esprit de corps*.[8] These qualities can be best achieved if the Party is limited to a small membership consisting partly of professional conspirators, agitators and political organizers, and partly of the members of government, military and managerial hierarchies. In such a Party the zealots and the careerists, specialists in conspiracy, vigilance and violence, tend to take the lead. As a result, the Party which had been originally conceived as the "vanguard of the working people," which effectively "guides" a devoted proletariat,[9] remained instead an essentially conspiratorial institution and was bound to lose its initial intimate contact with the broad strata of the population.

II

A small faction of professional conspirators, which rules in opposition to the traditionally rooted demands for egalitarian acceptance and full political and social participation, must rely on active help of experts in all fields of political organization and social control to maintain its monopoly of all power. The top hierarchies of these various strata of specialists are all trusted

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Party members. Together with the policy-making Party bodies they form the ruling class of the Soviet society. This top Party-state governing class consists perhaps of about two hundred thousand people or one tenth of one per cent of the total population. They are often referred to as the *Partia i Pravitelstvo*—the Party and the government.

The middle and lower layers of government specialists are often referred to as the *Sluzhashchie*. This stratum includes the rank and file of the learned professions, the rank and file of the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia, the middle and lower professional military, the middle and lower government managerial ranks, the engineers and the technicians. According to the 1939 census the number of those in the sluzhashchie class, that is "all those who work in offices" was close to thirty million or seventeen per cent of the total Soviet population, as contrasted to the industrial labor (*rabochie*) which formed thirty-two per cent and the peasantry (*krestiane*) which formed forty-six per cent of the total.

The more one goes down this social scale, the smaller becomes the proportion of Party members to non members and of the privileged to the non-privileged. One's position in this caste-like pyramid determines his status expressed not only in the form of income, but even more so in the extent to which he gets the benefits of various social services, the extent of appurtenances,[10] the amount of freedom of personal movement, and the degree of superordination and subordination.

The privileged position of the educated and semi-educated classes is well manifested in the internal structure of the Bolshevik Party. As late as 1930 about 65 percent of Party members were workers or recruited from the working class, about 20 percent were peasants or of peasant background, and less than 15 percent belonged to the white collar class. But by 1941–42 the composition of the Party was reversed and apparently at present more than 70 percent of the new candidates and members are recruited from among the educated and official classes.[11] The Party rules, which in the first years of Bolshevik regime had favored the industrial proletariat, and to a certain extent the soldiers and the collective peasants, had to be revised in order to

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ease the entrance of the upper classes into the Party ranks. This was done in 1939.[13] According to Pravda's figures, in 1947 out of five to six million Party members and candidates, about one-third had university or middle school education (1,700,000).[15] The extent to which these upper classes imposed their dominance over the Party is indicated by the figures according to which at the Eighteenth Party Conference in 1941, the percentage of delegates with a complete college or university education was 41.8 as against only 6.5 percent of the voting delegates with higher education at the Party Congress in 1924.[14]

Such a Party structure is very much out of proportion to the general ratio of educated to non-educated classes in the Soviet Union, since at least four-fifths of the Soviet subjects have less than high school education. The Bolshevik Party structure is also greatly out of proportion to the vocational composition of the Soviet Union where still about three-fourths of the population belong to the strata of peasants and of industrial labor. The conspiratorial nature of the Party, the complexity of the Soviet system of rule and the need for increasing specialization of Party members in activities on which the Bolshevik power rests, favor limitation of Party membership to the educated and ruling classes.

The meaning of education and specialization in Soviet power structure becomes clearer if the system of controlled schooling in the Soviet Union is kept in mind. Both university and middle school education are mainly within the reach of higher classes.[15] It is extremely difficult for the average industrial wage-earner or peasant to send any of his children to more than elementary school because the tuition fees and the living costs in educational centers are above his income. The low wages of the industrial labor and the peasantry make it necessary for all family members, including mother and young children, to contribute to the family income by full time or part time work. Also the government conscripts youths for labor reserve battalions mainly from these strata. The children and youths from these strata depend therefore entirely upon the government stipends if they have any ambition and necessary pretraining for higher education. However in selecting candidates for schooling at govern-

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Building on the traditional role of the Father in the Russian family the Party portrays the Party Leader as a strict and distant but also watchful and solicitous man who takes good care of his family. Following the traditional image of God and of the Father, the Party Leader is pictured as being benevolent toward those who submit to him unconditionally, but as being wrathful and merciless toward his foes and all those who disobey. And just like the members of the Great-Russian family, the Soviet people are expected to show "filial gratitude" to their Elder for his care and vigilance. Hence the supreme Party Leader is addressed as "our own father" (*rodnoy otets*), teacher (*uchitel*), leader (*vozhd*), friend (*drug*), and feeder (*kormilets*). Articles and letters of gratitude published daily in the Soviet press invariably mention his fatherly solicitude (*otecheskaya zabota*), his wise (*mudry*) plan and his genius (*geny*). Without fail they thank him ardently (*goryachee spasibo*) for what he has done for the well-being (*blago*), happiness (*schastie*), and world mightiness of the Soviet state (*velichaishaya derzhava mira*). On the occasion of the Leader's birthday numerous songs and musical compositions include titles which convey the idea of dependence upon and filial gratitude to an All-Powerful and All-Wise Vozhd.

It is expected that such identifications will reinforce in the Soviet people the feeling of guilt and make them redouble their efforts in building and supporting the Soviet system. Thus in the letters which various institutions, organizations and associations write to Vozhd, pledges are given to fulfill and overfulfill their quotas and to improve quality of products in gratitude for his unceasing "paternal care" and solicitude. And if they have failed, stayed behind, or have not come up to the expectations of their "father and teacher," they admit their guilt and promise to spare no efforts to improve, and thus arrest his wrath and rejection.[39] Not only lowly and humble folk from the bottom of the Soviet social pyramid, but men and women on the lofty peaks of Soviet arts and sciences, write such letters to Stalin in the same tone of religious reverence and humility, that strongly remind one both of the servility of Czarist official classes and of the prayers to an All-Mighty and wrathful God in the Russian Orthodox Church.

The ruling hierarchy realizes, however, that deification of the

665 The ruling hierarchy realizes, however, that deification of the
208 Party leader would not produce desired effects unless supported by rewards, that is, actual gains or hopes of gains ascribed to his wisdom. It is for this reason that Stalin's name is invariably linked with and symbolically attached to all the outstanding accomplishments of the Soviet system. Stalin is also pictured as incorporating in himself longings and aspirations, dreams and yearnings both of the Soviet people and of all the oppressed and humiliated in the world, of all those who are rejected and deprived of good things in life. Such an image of Stalin strengthens culturally and structurally rooted identification with suffering. He is therefore represented as a symbol of the interests and hopes of all hard-working and suffering mankind. Hence the epoch in which we live, the epoch that is renowned for the strivings of the working masses (of those who suffer), for acceptance in an equalitarian society is to be known as "Stalin's Epoch" (*Stalinskaya Epokha*).

869 643 But even this linking of Stalin's name with all significant achievements of Soviet society in the field of economy, government, science, and art is not considered sufficient to prevent doubts and skepticism. Deep faith in the Vozhd and identification with him which will be so strong that it will endure most adverse circumstances and make people ready for great and supreme sacrifices must be instilled early in childhood. Thus already in nurseries the children were given toys on which it was inscribed "Thanks to Comrade Stalin for happy and joyful childhood" (*Spasibo tovarishchu Stalinu z schastlivoe i radostnoe detstvo*). Small children are taught to recite stories which emphasize the dependence of the whole country upon Vozhd who is compared with the rising sun. The Soviet children are told that no child and [illegible] youth is so fortunate in any other place in the world. They are assured that Vozhd is doing everything in his power to make their lives prosperous and happy. The children are expected therefore to show a feeling of gratitude toward Vozhd, the Party, and the government and must grow up as worthy fighters to take the place of the present leaders:

> We, the children of the Soviet Union, the happiest country in the world, feel the constant solicitude for us by the Party, the government, and our beloved leader, comrade Stalin.

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Comrade Stalin is the best friend of us children, of all the children of the world. It is he who builds for us the best schools, palaces of culture, stadiums and camps, where we can become strong and healthy, so that we can study more and better in the winter time, when we go to school. We must grow up as fighters worthy to take the place of those now present here (*Applause*)—as fighters devoted to the cause of the Party, devoted to the cause of the Communist International (*Applause*). Long live our beloved Stalin! (*Applause*).[40]

Accordingly the study and imitation of the life of the two deified Soviet leaders, Lenin and Stalin, is considered to be one of the primary duties and a sacred obligation of every Pioneer and Komsomol. The aim of the Party is to form the conscience of the young according to an idealized image of Lenin and Stalin. Young people are told to think constantly of their leaders, to be inspired by them, to follow them, and to love them. It is often pointed out that the reason that Stalin became so great and achieved the leading position in the Party was because he was such a faithful follower and loyal disciple of Lenin. "We must do everything so that our life is such as the unforgettable Iliich wanted it to be."[41] "In the soul of each one of us there is one and only one image which governs all of us. That is the image of the great Stalin."[42] And if a Pioneer or Komsomol is relaxing in his duties and vigilance, he is instantly reminded: "Comrade Iliich would not have approved of you." Stalin himself in his speeches often stressed the need to imitate Lenin:

> Remember, love, study, Iliich, our teacher, our leader. Fight and defeat enemies, internal and external—like Iliich. Build a new existence, a new mode of life, a new culture—like Iliich. Never refuse to do even the smallest jobs, because out of little things the great things are constructed—this is one of the important legacies of Iliich.[43]

IV

The apotheosis of Stalin did not seem to have sufficient appeal among sophisticated and disaffected intelligentsia, nor among dissatisfied and apathetic laboring masses who tended to blame Stalin for their ills. Nor was the identification of the Party with Mother sufficient to inspire faith in Bolshevik system. It was

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The wording of the Soviet armed forces oath bears witness to the vigor of this discipline and the strength of social pressure brought to its support. In addition to the punishment that may be expected by the Soviet soldier who did not fulfill his duty as expected, or who did not promptly sacrifice his life for the country is, according to this oath, "hatred and contempt of the working people" (*nenavist i prezrenie trudyashchikhsya*).[65]

At the same time the moral authority of the commander has been enhanced by a great amount of educational work and political agitation. The commander's unconditional authority is also consolidated with the help of an elaborate system of ranks, medals, and uniforms, and by the introduction of caste-like relations between the officers and the rank-and-file, a situation which is supported by the general trend in the Soviet society toward differentiation, superordination and subordination, and sharp social stratification.

Accordingly, Soviet practices in military education and training favor different types of schools according to the rank and the class. In the school for commanders the admittance practices favor children of professional army officers. In this manner Soviet military schools tend to solidify the present military caste system and to develop professional classes of hereditary warriors. Following Czarist traditions there is much pomp, ritual and ceremonial in the armed forces. There is also a certain emphasis on mysticism manifested in kneeling, bowing of heads in silence and stress on holiness. All these are means of appealing to emotions, of emphasizing the sacredness of military duty, and of developing loyalty and dedication to the colors.

As a means of political control the armed forces of the Soviet Union are completely centralized and thoroughly infiltrated by Party men. The strength of Party control of the Soviet armed forces is best seen in the degree of Party infiltration of its commanding personnel. By 1934 the percentage of Party and Party-affiliated persons in the commanding positions of the Soviet Army was about 72. The percentages were even greater in the branches which are considered especially crucial from the point of view of security, such as the tank divisions and the air force. In these two branches the percentage of Party and Party-affiliated

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701 members was close to 85 percent. And as to the top level of the 665 army command by 1941 this top military hierarchy was one hundred percent Communist.[66]

To maintain ideological purity among the armed forces and to strengthen the Party's control is the specific function of the political officer and of the Partorg (Party organizer). The political officers have now regular army training and in the actual fighting, the political officer becomes "the commander's substitute or takes his place when the commander is disabled."[67] It is this ability of the Party to replace any army commander by an army trained but Party devoted man, that is expected to insure absolute control of the armed forces by the Party even in times of greatest stress and defeat. The duty of the political officers is [703] not only to interpret and to propagandize the latest utterances of the Party leaders or the decisions of the Politburo, but to watch for any weakening of enthusiasm, for any pessimism or gloomy views that may be noticed and to combat vigorously any signs of demoralization. The most important task of the political officers, however, is to cultivate martial spirit and to build up morale, thus creating "a psychological condition which sets up resistance to fear of discomfort, pain, or death."[68]

701 The goal of the Party is to infiltrate with martial spirit not 157 the armed forces alone, but the whole Soviet population as a 208 means of bolstering the morale of the Soviet masses behind the Bolshevik regime. This is being achieved by means of militarization of all public activities. The Bolshevik leaders consider that militarization is the only morale builder in a situation in which the laboring masses tend to become lethargic, apathetic and disinterested in their work. Speaking of the experiences in World War II, Stalin said that in that struggle people got transformed and acquired new qualities which strengthened the power of the [461] Bolsheviks: "But the people themselves in the rear have been transformed, they have been more efficient, less slipshod, more disciplined; they have learned to work in wartime fashion, and to realize their duty to our motherland."[69] Stalin looks at sports and athletics from the same point of view:

> We stood for five hours on the tomb while the show went on. The Generalissimo showed no sign of fatigue. On the contrary, he ap-

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peared to enjoy every minute of the show . . . A final remark of the Generalissimo's while we were watching the sports spectacle was that mass athletics and exercises were fine because of their effect upon the populace. He said, "This develops the war spirit."[70]

In accordance with the Bolshevik need for morale building most Soviet institutions have been militarized, including the Party. Thus when a Soviet subject leaves his school and his Pioneer or Komsomol organization and enters a factory, a kolhoz, an office, a research laboratory, or becomes a Party worker, he has been already trained for work in a society which is in most of its aspects organized along military lines. Anywhere where he is assigned a job he might find military discipline and military relationships. In a number of civilian jobs he will wear a uniform with badges of his rank. In his factory or kolhoz he may become a member of a "shock brigade" or a "hero of labor" and therefore an important link in an all-embracing Five-Year-Plan whose main emphasis is on military preparedness. As a Party member he will take his position in the Party pyramid as a common soldier, as a petty officer, or as a higher officer:

> Three or four thousand men of the high command—the generals of our Party. Then 30 to 40 thousand intermediate commanders; these constitute the officers' corps of our Party. And further, 100 to 180 thousand of the leading elements of our party—these are, so to speak —the subaltern officers of the Party.[71]

In a militarized society military language is used in all activities. Military language has always been a tradition in the Bolshevik Party and has been always widely employed by Lenin, Stalin, and other Party leaders. Therefore when addressing a meeting, or when writing in a newspaper or in a literary or scholarly periodical a Soviet subject is expected to employ military phrases, and use analogies taken from military campaigns and military experiences. He will speak of "reconnoissance," "skirmishes," "encounters," "operations," "outposts," "fortresses," "citadels," "maneuvres," "camps," "cadres," etc. and he will be expected to do his duty on his own "battle post." If he rises to the top of the Party hierarchy and if he especially distinguishes himself in his civil activities he might be endowed

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with the real rank and uniform of general or perhaps even with that of marshal.

24
FAMILY BACKGROUND OF PERSONALITY IN SOVIET RUSSIA

I

PROMPTED by drives of destructive aggression and
594 supported by the ideological traditions of Nihilism and Anarch-
829 ism, the Bolsheviks were determined to destroy the family in order to have unchallenged control over the training of children and the molding of their personalities. Their view was that there was not much that they could do with the parents, but that "the children belonged to the Party." Such a trend of thought was supported also by an intense reaction of many people against the old patriarchal and despotic family pattern which existed in the Czardom. There was a strong desire on the part of many family members to liberate themselves from the old practices of parental and marital authority and discipline. It was in such an atmosphere that the Bolshevik Party at first introduced a series of decrees and measures which greatly facilitated the dissolution of family ties.[1]

The Bolsheviks, however, soon realized that the family could not be allowed to disintegrate without dire consequences for their regime which was bent upon rapid industrialization and militarization and was in great need of manpower. Also as a
[736] result of wars, famines and a growing number of broken families, there were hundreds of thousands of homeless and neglected children and aged people. Care for these proved too great a burden for an economy which had to use all its available resources primarily for state security and war preparedness. Thus instead of destroying the family the Bolsheviks decided to maintain it but to manipulate it so as to use it as an instrument

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strengthen the control of the Party over that fundamental social institution. This intent to completely subject the family to the Party's aims is expressed in Bolshevik ideological parlance as "the cultural-educational influence of the socialist state upon family relationships in the direction of strengthening socialist principles."[21]

II

Following Russian traditional attachment to the Mother Country, Soviet pedagogical principles demand that love for the *Rodina* should be emphasized in the training of children. Building on traditional mother-child attachment in the Russian family, the Party instructs teachers to point out to their pupils how Lenin was attached to his mother.[22] It also emphasizes the tender relations between Stalin and his mother. Teachers are told that this natural attachment of a child to his mother should be used as a means to instill in the child love for his Mother Country.[23]

At the same time in the school textbooks, in the daily press, in the speeches of Party leaders and all other means of mass communication, it is the Bolshevik Party that is represented to be the Mother of the Komsomols, Pioneers, and Octobrists, and the "mother of the Soviet people." The love for the Rodina is, therefore, interpreted as being conditioned by and subordinated to the primary duty of love for the Party or the Leader with whom the Party is identified. Hence, even when mother-attachment remains strong in a Soviet child, the attempt is made to transfer that attachment to the Party and to raise loyalty to the Leader and to the Party above loyalty to the country. Thus Party loyalty precedes both family and national loyalty in the Soviet educational philosophy. "Party is above everything else," the Bolsheviks say. And it is this loyalty to the Leader, Party or Cause which precedes all other loyalties that forms the core of Bolshevik internationalism and the basis of its world appeal, not unlike the appeal of a universal church.

Most children of elementary school age and a greater part of those on secondary school level belong to Party auxiliary organizations, the Octobrists, the Pioneers and the Komsomols. In the great variety of activities in which these organizations are ex-

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pected to help the Party "at all times," there is always a possibility of conflict between the demands of the Party and those of the family. Also, owing to a great shortage of manpower and a very low standard of living, most women, with the exception of those from the upper ruling strata, are forced to work long hours outside the home. Many of them have to engage in heavy physical labor. Such mothers are not only physically exhausted at the end of the day, but are often disillusioned, bitter, as well as critical of the system, a fact which is confirmed by a rather high percentage of women in convict labor camps. Such mothers cannot pay sufficient attention to their children.

At the same time great demands and responsibilities placed on parents in regard to the discipline of their children and the interference of the Party and the government in family affairs often causes harshness in treatment of children. Hence overstrictness as well as negligence of children is the result.[24] Such a situation favors both feelings of rejection and revolt, as well as extreme self-concern and destructive aggressiveness on a larger scale and in a more intense way than in the days of Czardom. And since the Soviet system of vigilance encourages family members to inform on one another, mutual suspicions, fears, and hostilities rooted in patriarchal traditions are greatly magnified. Training in self-confidence and trust, and in group attachment cannot thrive in such circumstances. But it is exactly self-concern, mistrust, and destructive aggression that are so instrumental in the perpetuation of the Bolshevik rule.

Unstable political and economic conditions, together with consequences of wars, depletion of rural areas of adult men, famines, convict labor camps to which millions of parents have been confined, have resulted in an unprecedented number of broken families and a growing number of neglected, illegitimate and delinquent children. A number of such children, especially orphans of war heroes, at the age of nine are sent to military schools. Many neglected and delinquent children at the age of 3 to 13 are sent to special homes for children which are in charge of the secret political police.[25] The increasing stress on internal vigilance, together with the pressing need of the political police to feed their vast economic enterprises with cheap

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[Ivan the Terrible]

convict labor, indicate that the number of such children will not decrease in the foreseeable future.[26]

Such children are considered to have an ideal background for their training as future specialists in conspiracy, vigilance, and violence. Therefore the children who have been raised in a tense family atmosphere or who have been rejected and neglected by their families form a fertile ground from which the Bolshevik rulers recruit a significant part of their future followers and leaders. But what is the future of a society whose ruling classes are being formed out of persons who have been raised in the midst of harshness, brutality and lack of human warmth or whose desire for emotional attachment has been thwarted?

By the middle of the sixteenth century Ivan the Terrible, who himself was left motherless early in his childhood and was exposed to great instability in his emotional attachments, became a victim of ideas of persecution and of boundless and insatiable thirst for power and self aggrandizement. Driven by such compulsions he undertook to organize a body of fanatical devotees who were bound by oath to forswear association not only with "friends and brethren" but even with their own parents, and to serve the Czar blindly and unconditionally. These *Oprichniki* became renowned in history as a brotherhood of brigands who lived separated and isolated from the rest of society—"men vile and filled with every sort of cruelty."[27] Throughout the day they indulged in savage torturing and killing of suspects after they had attended the morning liturgy. In their wild outrages they terrorized peaceful citizens immediately after their brow-beating prostrations before the Altar.

In the same manner in the Ottoman Empire, the elite militia of the Sultans, known as the Janizaries, were recruited from among the children who were often early in their childhood or boyhood taken away from their parents to be raised and trained in loyalty to the Sultan only. Still earlier in the society of Eurasian steppe warriors want of bonds of human attachment brought about instability and explosiveness of Asiatic empires. Both the Asiatic conquerors and the Janizaries became renowned in history for their recklessness and barbarism. They also rebelled and excelled in insubordination to established

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There is also a deliberate policy on the part of the ruling class
177 to prevent personal contact and exchange of ideas between the
626 Soviet subjects and the foreigners. In this way the Bolshevik
609 Party is performing the same role in the social and psychological development of Russia as the Orthodox Church has done in the past. Xenophobia and a deliberate avoidance of strangers easily develops in such circumstances, traits which have been noticed by all the observers of Soviet society. Xenophobia is so outstanding in the Soviet world that it has been noticed even by the most casual and most friendly visitors. Soviet authorities have done their best to encourage this feeling. "We were completely cut off
[625] from the great bulk of the Russian people by constant police surveillance, by propaganda and by the threat of punishment."[7] "The air itself was clothed with hate and suspicion . . . penetrated even to the child world. . . . Our next door neighbours, too, were grilled, and though we had known them for years, they took to avoiding us utterly."[8] As a rule, only police informers are assigned to foreigners as servants because everyone else is afraid to work for them.

517 In such conditions original ideas and independent intellectual
647 pursuits are fraught with great risks and it is often the less original, the mediocre, the cynical, the shrewd and the unscrupulous that take the lead. Some independent and creative people in such circumstances tend to become apathetic, to withdraw, to sever social contacts and put an end to their creative activities.[9] Others tend to seek safety in bureaucratic routine and in avoidance of initiative and responsibility. For each decision they tend to cover themselves by presenting the matter to various committees, or by seeking the Party's advice, thus letting others shoulder the responsibility.

517 The social consequences of such a development are then
● 665 manifested in a pronounced anti-intellectualism, bureaucratism and vigilantism. The ascendancy of anti-intellectualistic and watchdog trends in Soviet society is well expressed, for instance, in the change in the composition of the membership of the Politbure. In this topmost ruling body the more intellectual types of revolutionaries have been gradually purged and replaced by the activists, the semi-educated professional conspirators, Party organizers, agitators and former security officials.

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nology opponents are referred to as the "enemies of the people." They are said to be "groups of spies," "traitors to the country," "dregs of humanity," "fiendish criminals," "pigmies," "useless rubbish," "hordes of barbarians," "hangmen," "cannibals," "enemies of humankind."[18] These "instruments of oppression of the proletariat," full of "falsehoods and perverse lies," "narrow-minded petty-bourgeois with sickly mentality," have to be mercilessly "smashed," "annihilated," "crushed," "destroyed" with an "ever greater frenzy and ferocity."[19] They have to be "cleansed" from the Soviet society in order to ensure the consolidation of the rule of the Bolsheviks.

It was in order to justify ruthlessness in dealing with the opposition that labelling, denouncing and name-calling has become prominent in Bolshevik practices. Any softness toward the "enemies" is denounced as bourgeois "sentimentalism."[20] Instead, *besposhchadnost* (mercilessness), *surovost* (ruthlessness), *besstrashie* (fearlessness), and *zheleznaya volia* (iron will) are said to be the "Lenin ways" by which the political workers are to deal with all the "opponents, slackers, and deviants."

If in this "life and death fight," ruthlessness, pitilessness, and mercilessness have to be applied then also cunning, guile, craft, ruse and deceit are equally welcome as useful means. Lenin is often quoted as saying that the Communists, when necessary, must "resort to strategy and adroitness, illegal proceedings, reticence and subterfuge,"[21] that they must use any trick and veiling of truth; that they must dodge and maneuver. They must be ready in the interest of final success to suffer humiliation and self-abasement. In the interest of the cause and of final victory, they must know how to retreat and how to "crawl in the mud on their bellies."[22] According to the Bolshevik teaching, there is not an "absolute ethic." Every act is measured by how it corresponds to the interests of the group.[23]

III

Emphasis on extreme hatred, on ruse, and on mercilessness against those who do not conform is not new in the history of Russian society. Destructive aggression formed an aspect of the Czarist rule; it was manifested in the persecution of religious

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has been made between "imperialist war of aggression" and "national and class liberation." The first is said to be an "unjust war" of imperalists, exploiters and war mongers, the latter is a movement of the peoples to liberate themselves from the capitalist yoke or from colonial oppression. It is said that in this "just struggle" of the peoples of the world against oppressors the Soviet Union will unselfishly interfere with its armies to help the people to liberate themselves and also to protect liberated peoples from counter-revolution. It is therefore the duty of the working class and of "progressive-minded people" all over the world to strengthen the might of the Soviet Fatherland as "the center of international revolution":

> Being the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of Socialist construction, the land of great working class achievements, of the union of the workers with the peasants, and of a new culture marching under the banner of Marxism. . . . the USSR inevitably becomes the base of the world movement of all oppressed classes, the center of international revolution, the greatest factor in world history. In the USSR, the world proletariat for the first time acquires a country that is really its own, and for the colonial movements the USSR becomes a powerful center of attraction.[32]

In order to make Communist parties a tool of this new "Third Rome" ideology all these parties had to follow in their internal organization the Bolshevik pattern of rigid centralism and of unconditional obedience of all the subordinate organs to the higher bodies.[33] Each local Party had to be centralized in such a manner that its leadership was "endowed with complete power, authority, and ample rights" which would enable it to impose "an iron discipline" over its members.[34] All members were expected to accept such centralized Party leadership with absolute power and to "submit to its dictates."[35] This was possible only if "the strictest military discipline" and "unconditional subordination" were established within the ranks of each Communist Party:

> . . . The Communist Party should be organized on the basis of strict proletarian centralism. In order to lead the working class successfully during the long, stubborn civil war, the Communist Party must

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establish the strictest military discipline within its own ranks. The experience of the Russian Communist Party . . . has proved that the victory of the worker is impossible without a severe discipline . . . and unconditional subordination of subordinate units to the decision of those above them, and a strong Party central organ, whose decrees are binding upon all the leaders of Party life . . .[36]

In this manner, the principles of absolute dominance, unconditional obedience and ruthless discipline rooted in the political traditions of Russian society and reinforced by the structure of Bolshevik power were extended to all the parties on which the Bolsheviks imposed their control. In the same manner, also, the traditional filial attitudes of reverence, gratitude, love and humility have been established in relations of these parties to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Accordingly also, destructive aggression became one of the fundamental orientations of these parties. The Communist parties have been encouraged to use all means at their disposal, "including force of arms" in order "to overthrow the international bourgeoisie,"[37] and to "lay low the exploiters . . . completely defeat them . . . crush their resistance. . . ."[38]

As a result, the language of these parties, like that of Bolshevism, stresses hatred, destruction and war. For instance, in the Theses and Statutes and in the Program the emphasis is on extreme hostility expressed in many stereotyped phrases, such as "hatred and relentless aggression," "pitiless struggle," "persistent and merciless denunciation," "merciless contempt," "stubborn, armed and ruthless fight," "fierce and decisive battles," "ruthless war." These means against the "mortal enemy" are said to be necessary in order "to destroy the apparatus of the bourgeoisie," and to bring about the "violent overthrow" of bourgeois power, "at whatever cost." Each Communist party is expected to foster hatred and destructive aggression by all means of propaganda and agitation. The Communist press in all countries and popular Communist songs are especially significant in this respect.

Since the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union, just as the Bolshevik Party itself, stress hatred, pitilessness and destruction, they tend to attract into their ranks people who for one

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reason or another feel rejected, non-accepted, humiliated, oppressed or ostracized in their own society and who find in these parties an opportunity to vent their accumulated grievances and pent-up hostilities. But they also tend to attract people who for idealistic and humanistic reasons seek Utopias of all-human brotherhood. They attract ambitious and talented intellectuals and semi-educated people who have been thwarted in their professional and political expectations; also intellectuals and semi-intelligentsia with mediocre abilities but strong urges for self-assertion and desire for leadership and domination. They also attract many patriots belonging to oppressed nationalities or races, who have identified themselves with their nation, race or ethnic and cultural minority and seek acceptance of their group in a Communistic millenium. In times of social upheavals these parties attract also many adventurers, criminals, vagabonds, and other deviants and offenders.

It is, however, people overcharged with destructive aggression who in these parties tend to climb toward the top levels of Party leadership, because it is such people to whom the Party offers great opportunities for their destructive urges and who therefore tend to be unconditionally loyal to Moscow as contrasted to the more moderate and more humane and patriotic elements, who for one reason or another might not want always to accept Moscow's dictate. As a result of such internal conditions the history of all Communist parties has been a history of internal intrigues, splits, purges, and frequent bloodshed which in turn made it easier to completely subdue these organizations to the will of the Kremlin:

> . . . those who disorganize the Party are to be flayed without mercy. Championing as we do working class unity, we shall with so much more energy and irreconcilability fight for unity within our Parties. There can be no room in our Parties for factions, or for attempts at factionalism. Whoever will try to break up the iron unity of our ranks by any kind of factionalism will get to feel what is meant by the Bolshevik discipline that Lenin and Stalin have always taught us (applause) . . . *The Party is above everything else!* (Loud applause) To guard the Bolshevik unity of the Party as the apple of one's eye is the first and highest law of Bolshevism![50]

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It was such thoroughly regimented and indoctrinated Party organizations whose leaderships comprised a hard core of violent and unscrupulous fanatics without bonds of personal or local attachment but unconditionally subservient to the Kremlin, that became a powerful instrument in the international aggression of Bolshevism. Promising Utopias to all disgruntled, rejected and disaffected, such parties became the main instrument of the Soviet Union in its territorial annexations, as well as in the formation of a ring of satellite states. The objective of this expansion was always the same: to turn outward the internal tensions, to enhance the economic, the strategic, and the military potential of the Soviet Union, and to increase the power and influence of the Bolshevik hierarchy at home and abroad.

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New modifications in Bolshevik ideology were necessary to explain such policies. The Communist parties in the capitalist countries are now said to be unable by themselves alone to overthrow local bourgeoisies or to prevent a counter-revolution after capitalism has been overthrown. These parties therefore need active help of the Soviet armed forces not only to overthrow the capitalist class, but also to eliminate the possibility of counter-revolution and to protect the national independence of the newly formed Communist controlled states—the "People's Democracies." This "liberating" and "protecting" role of the Soviet Army and complete dependence of liberated states upon the Soviet Union is a replica of the dominance-submission and protection-dependence relationships on which the Soviet Union itself has been founded. The dependent states are expected to be ready to defend and protect the Soviets "unconditionally and without hesitation." Such a system of Moscow-satellite relationships is considered so overwhelmingly important by the Kremlin rulers that they demand that their satellite leaders constantly emphasize even in fundamental state laws their dependency upon and subordination to the Soviet Union:

> The armed might of the great Soviet Union liberated our country from the yoke of German fascism, smashed the landlords and the capitalistic anti-popular state powers, and opened to our working

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people the road to democratic development. Coming to power after severe struggles with the lords and defenders of the old order, the Hungarian working class, in union with the working peasants, rebuilt our war-destroyed country with the unselfish support of the Soviet Union. Under the guidance of the working class hardened in decade long struggles, benefiting by the experience of the 1919 social revolution, depending on the Soviet Union, our people began laying the foundations of socialism.[40]

To emphasize the superiority of the Soviet Union, its undisputed leadership and dependence of the satellites upon it in the struggle for world revolution, an important distinction has been made in regard to the social and political structure of the dependencies in comparison with that of the Soviet state. Though both are said to be the "dictatorships of the proletariat,"[41] the Soviet state is said to be carrying out the transition from Socialism to Communism; the "people's democracies," on the other hand, are said to be carrying out only the transition from capitalism to Socialism.[42]

Complete political and economic dependence of the satellites upon the Soviet Union is ideologically justified by the claim that the general objectives of world revolution presuppose an industrially as well as a militarily powerful Soviet Union as a base. To this primary objective of all Communists local interests of the satellites must be subordinated. Therefore, any opposition to such plans or any hints that the "fraternal assistance" offered by the Soviet Union in the interest of the revolution might not be completely unselfish is immediately castigated as "nationalism," as "opportunism," and as "treason":

> The essential task, that of laying the foundation of Socialism in Poland, can be carried only in close alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union . . . Any tendency to weaken cooperation with the Soviet Union is directed against the very foundation of the People's Democracy . . . Anyone who imagines that the people's democratic state can be formed merely as a self-sufficient body, on a national scale, isolated from the class struggle on an international scale . . . will inevitably sink into the slough of nationalism and treachery.[43]

This system of political, military and economic dominance of the dependencies implies an elaborate system of watching, super-

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vising, checking and controlling. Accordingly just as in the Soviet Union in each satellite country primary attention is paid to the personnel policies. "Department of Cadres" and "Personnel Bureaus," headed by people who are trusted friends of the Soviet Union and advised by Soviet experts, supervise the political reliability and the labor efficiency of all. Observers of these agencies and Soviet experts are at work in every Party organization, every office and every factory shop. The hiring, releasing, and transferring of personnel rests with these bureaus.

In all these considerations political reliability and not professional competence is of foremost importance, a situation that favors the rise of professionally incompetent zealots and careerists ahead of people who are professionally able but more cautious and moderate, or more independent.[44] In consequence, just as in the Soviet Union, there is a keen struggle for positions and ranks and there is a premium on specialists in political organization and violence, a great demand for watchdogs, agitators, overseers and labor-drivers. Unconditional faith in and devotion to Russia is considered, however, to be the first and primary prerequisite for advance in satellite political, military and managerial hierarchies.[45] Hence periodical purges or "verifications" of Party members are undertaken to insure that only sufficiently Russified people remain in the Party.

The need of total control of dependencies dictates also a divide and rule policy among the satellites. In accordance with such policies the Kremlin instigates and encourages local nationalisms, regionalisms and separatisms and external aggressiveness of the satellites while at the same time it must prevent pan-movements and excessive territorial ambitions which might challenge the dominance of Moscow. Thus while instigating Asiatic nationalism the Soviet Union must prevent the championship of the Pan-Mongolian idea by Mongolia or Communist China. While encouraging various Balkan nationalisms it had to prevent the formation of a South Slav Federation.

Another means of promoting effective control of and dominance of the satellites is isolating these vassal countries from the West and therefore preventing any Western influence to undermine Bolshevik rule. This aim is achieved by deliberately pro-

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voking tension between these dependencies and the Western world, and by promoting anti-cosmopolitanism and castigating satellite intellectuals who show pro-Western attitudes.[46] The control of the Church and persecution of Church leaders, especially those with strong Western ties such as the Catholic hierarchy, serves the same purpose.

In order to strengthen this system of total regimentation and control of its dependencies the Soviet Union formed in 1947 an over-all agency as an instrument of coordination of its major policies toward these states, the Cominform. This over-all agency of conformity and vigilance which took the place of the old Comintern is designed by the Soviet Union to bring about a concerted pressure upon any eventual signs of resistance to the policies dictated by Moscow.

The third meeting of the Cominform (November, 1949), for instance, was especially concerned with means to increase "revolutionary vigilance," to detect "deviationism, opportunism, sectarianism" within Communist parties and to wage an "irreconcilable struggle" against all manifestations of "bourgeois nationalism" and against the "provocations and intrigues of the American imperialists." The Communists who did not unconditionally submit to the wishes of the Kremlin were denounced as "imperialist agents and spies," as the "splitters" in the ranks of the working class, as "tools of imperialists," as "traitors," "reactionary nationalists," "clerical and fascist elements," "counter-revolutionaries," "slanderers," "provokers," "fabricators of foulest lies borrowed from the arsenal of Hitler."[47] In this manner the "Party line" laid down by the Kremlin is universally and unquestioningly adopted by all.

VI

The difficulties of control which arise within such a system of vassal dependencies are well exemplified in the relationships between Soviet Russia and Communist Yugoslavia. In the latter country, the Communist-led Partisans were placed in power when the Red Army took Belgrade, but the quick withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the territory of Partisan-controlled Yugoslavia did not allow the Bolshevik Party sufficient time to place

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its own appointees and trusted agents in all the key positions in the Yugoslav Communist Party and in the Yugoslav state administration.[48]

Even during this short stay of the Red Army in Yugoslav territory, the relations between Communist-Partisan rulers of Yugoslavia and their Soviet liberators became tense. The tension resulted from the "haughty attitude" of the liberators and the hostility that this attitude provoked among the liberated.[49] And later when the Soviet Union attempted to infiltrate Yugoslavia with advisers and experts, the Yugoslav officers began "to abuse" the Soviet military advisers[50] and Yugoslav authorities showed such a "lack of hospitality and lack of confidence" that their security organs "controlled and supervised the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia."[51] The Yugoslav Communist authorities also refused economic information to the Soviet trade representatives and resented the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia collecting information about the conditions within the Yugoslav Communist Party. And when the Yugoslav Communist leaders and their agents prevented the attempt of the Soviet Union to establish a net of its intelligence agents in the country and within the Yugoslav Communist Party,[52] the final break could not be avoided any longer.[53]

Two totalitarian controls cannot exist in one and the same territory. Thus, when the Soviet Union had realized that Yugoslavia was under the firm control of the Yugoslav Communist Party and police. that they could not liquidate its leadership which became too challenging and could not therefore bring the country to a state of complete dependence, subordination and vassalage, the next alternative left was to expel Yugoslavia from the Cominform.[54] A Communist state out of the Kremlin's hold, if allowed to remain within the Soviet orbit, could undermine the very foundations of the Kremlin's dominance over other satellites.

Similar resentment, antagonism, and lack of trust that developed between the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Russian Politburo has always existed in all other satellite states in various degrees and forms.[55] Many Communists, particularly the "idealists" and patriots resent the presence of Russian

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experts, advisers, representatives, and agents occupying positions of power and control in each satellite country, especially their haughty and insulting behavior, constant tutoring and sermonizing on the part of Moscow and need to accept the Kremlin's dictates with humility and gratitude. Also economic exploitation of the vassal countries in the interest of the Soviet Union, the imposition of Russian language and Russian culture, the danger of military occupation and the threat of resettlement of whole sections of the population to Siberian mines and lumber camps, all of these cannot but provoke anxieties, fears, and hatreds on the part of the subjected peoples:[56]

> We are finding out that not only lack of knowledge and ability is displayed in the Czech Army toward the Soviet military science and Soviet war experiences, but that we encounter even a direct distaste and resistance based on hatred toward everything Soviet.[57]

For this reason "Titoism" in one form or another has appeared in all satellite countries. A "Titoist crisis," for instance, took place twice in Outer Mongolia, in 1924 and in 1930–32.[58] In other satellite states the same crises were manifested in a number of "spy trials" and execution of outstanding satellite leaders. But purges and trials do not eliminate the sources of dissatisfaction and hostility. Since the causes remain and constantly generate new feelings of destructive aggression, Bolshevik leaders have to constantly increase measures of security, vigilance, and control in all their dependencies. The Kremlin is therefore increasingly forced to rely on power-seeking careerists, on members of minority groups, on Russian subjects, and on children from dependent states taken to Russia and trained as "New Janizaries" to rule their own countries in a "Rokossovsky way."[59] The patriots and the humanists among the Communists have to make room for violent zealots and cynical careerists, "for such men who would not scruple any means in carrying out the orders. . ."[60] The leaders who fought with their people in underground movements against Nazi invaders have to give way to "a few individuals who spent the wartime in Moscow [and] were installed in a 'Rokossovski way' in the top positions . . . lacking the contact with the population and knowledge of its wishes, they mechani-

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cally apply methods which are in flagrant contradiction to our traditions and incompatible with them."[61] Such policies in turn only emphasize the feeling of insecurity, isolation and mistrust; they cause apathy and a slowing-down in economic and intellectual advance.[62]

In this manner the pattern of Bolshevik expansion which was designed to release and redirect the hostilities accumulated within Soviet society has only extended the area of strains and tensions. The addition of each new dependency therefore adds fresh pressures for more aggression directed outward. In such circumstances the Bolshevik leadership is forced not only to instigate its satellites toward external aggression but also to deliberately provoke and perpetuate international tension. By such means the Bolsheviks expect to maintain a constant external pressure that would work toward unity of the Soviet orbit and rallying of all dependencies behind Moscow.

In the meantime, however, such growth and expansion of Soviet power and Communist fomented unrest could not have failed to provoke increasing anxieties and fears in the countries which consider themselves threatened by Bolshevik advance. War preparedness in the West and formation of anti-Soviet military alliances has been the result. Mutual suspicions and international tension which have developed in these circumstances have increased to a point which has already taken the form of a "cold war" and of scattered localized warfare. Thus growing friction between these two increasingly hostile and aggressive worlds might eventually break into an all-out fighting on a global scale.

On the other hand increasing resistance to Soviet expansion on the part of Western powers might eventually completely seal the outlets for Soviet outward aggression. In such a case accumulating internal complexities and stresses generated by the structure of Soviet power might get out of the Kremlin's control and bring about disintegration of Bolshevism through internal conflicts, especially if these are widened and sharpened by means of planned external economic and psychological pressures.